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Directorate of Intelligence

Top Secret

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25X1

Afghanistan Situation Report

25X1

14 May 1985

Top Secret

NESA M 85-10095JX SOVA M 85-10094JX

14 May 1985



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AFGHANISTAN SITUATION	REPOR	t.T	

CONTENTS 25X1 1 INSURGENTS ATTACK AIRFIELDS Insurgents attacked four airfields in early May, despite Soviet and Afghan attempts to improve 25X1 security. 1 PROMOTIONS FAVOR PARCHAMIS 25X1 Recent regime military promotions heavily favored officers who belonged either to the Parchami faction of the PDPA or KHAD. 25X1 3 TRANSPORTATION COSTS INCREASING 25X1 The cost of transporting goods from Pakistan to Afghanistan is increasing because of the escalating cost of pack animals. 25X1 3 HIGH-LEVEL PERSONNEL CHANGES PENDING? 25X1 Babrak Karmal's departure for Moscow, probably including medical treatment, and the replacement of an Afghan Politburo member have triggered rumors of more personnel changes in the Afghan 25X1 Government. 25X1

UPCOMING EVENTS

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PERSPECTIVE		
AFGHANISTAN IN APRIL	5	25 X 1
Insurgent and Soviet activity picked up during April with both sides having some success.		25X1
This document is prepared weekly by the Office of Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis and the Office of Soviet Analysis. Questions and comments on the issues raised in the publication should be directed to	<i>,</i>	25 X 1
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the military. The promotions of Gulabzoi--the unofficial head of the Khalqi faction--and Nazar Mohammad suggests that the regime recognizes the need,

or was urged by the Soviets, not to appear too onesided in the promotions.

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TRANSPORTATION COSTS INCREASING	25 X 1
A representative of Medicins Sans Frontieres (MSF) recently told a US official that it cost \$30,000 to transport a ton of supplies to Badakshan Province from Pakistan last fall. MSF purchased 25 mules for the trip at a cost of about \$1,000 each, and ten died before reaching the destination. According to MSF, transportation costs will increase again this year because mules are now selling for \$2,500 each.	25X1
Comment: Shipping goods into Afghanistan has been expensive. The cost of pack animals increased by	
25 percent from 1983 to 1984 Late fall and winter trips also are more expensive because fodder for pack animals is difficult to get. The MSF projection for an increase in costs this year seems high; US officials put the	25X1 25X1
current cost of mules in Peshawar at between \$800 and \$1,100.	25X1
HIGH-LEVEL PERSONNEL CHANGES PENDING?	25 X 1
The departure of Babrak Karmal for Moscow and Kabul's naming of a respected nonparty politician, Abdul Hatif, as Chairman of the National Fatherland Front, replacing Politburo member Ziray, has triggered rumors of other high-level personnel changes. The Soviet Ambassador to Kabul, who normally tries to dampen these rumors, noted in a recent conversation with the US Charge that Babrak Karmal is a "sick man" and commented positively on the energy and intelligence of Prime Minister Keshtmand. The ambassador also noted that Politburo member Nur Ahmad Nur, who reportedly was exiled to Moscow for his role in fueling party factionalism, will be coming back to Kabul to assume an important position.	25X1
Comment: In recent months Moscow's frustration over the Afghan regime's inability to play a more effective role in the fighting and win more popular support has prompted a change of defense ministers and head of the National Fatherland Front, and it is possible that other high-level personnel changes are pending. The Soviets probably are still disinclined, however, to affect changes at the very top, because they see no	

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pr Eu go	oblem th rope abo ne for m	Iternative to Babrak. Babrak has a health at required treatment in the USSR or East ut every six months until 1984, but he has ore than a year without having to travel medical treatment.	25X
			25X1
UP COMIN	G EVENTS		
16	May	Babrak Karmal departs Moscow for Poland on an official visit.	25X ²
21	May	Ramadan begins.	25X
30	May	Anniversary of Afghanistan's independence from Great Britain, achieved in 1919.	25X ⁻
20	June	Ramadan ends.	25 X 1
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ECTIVE		
NISTAN IN APRIL	·	
The insurgents and the fighting in April with the Soviets continued parties outposts along the Afgloutposts along the Afgloutposts	both achieving some s preparations for late e insurgents maintaine han-Pakistani border a	uccess, and spring and d sieges of nd started
operations in a new are	ea or southern Arghani	S Cull.
The Eastern Provinces		
This month insurgents on Afghan Government o border. Konar Valley Afghan Army garrisons	utposts near the Pakis insurgents conti <u>nued t</u>	stani
casualties on Afghan G Province and continued in Paktia Province fro	to besiege most of the	angarhar ne outposts
Kheyl in the north.		

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	but caused little damage.	25X1 25X1
	resistance. Guerrilla forces received warnings of Soviet plans for operations near Kabul and were prepared for the attacks. Heavy fighting around Paghman reportedly resulted in high casualties among Soviet and Afghan forces and civilians. Insurgents also rocketed Kabul for the first time in four months	
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Out Look			
<u>Outlook</u>	•	•	
Soviet efforts prob regions in attempts	ably will focus on	the border	
Pakistan and Iran.			:
that small unit one	Soviets believe in rations are more e	ffactiva than	25X
increasingly on hel	ons. The Soviets a	are relying	237
guerrillas off quar	'd. Though the Sov	iets will dain	
some victories, as deficiencies in the	ur own intelliaence	e collection	
efforts, inability do collect it, and	to respond to inte	lligence when the	: y
networks prevent th guerrillas in large	em from locating ar	nd encaming the	
significant impact	on the insurgency.	make a	
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